# 1nc

### 1nc

**FOR indicates purpose**

FOR (as a preposition) in Merriam Websters Dictionary 12(<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/for>)

a —used as a function word to indicate purpose

**Energy Production means increase of use of an energy**

COAG 9 (Department of Climate Change on behalf of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Expert Group on Streamlining Greenhouse and Energy Reporting, "national Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Streamlining Protocol," http://www.climatechange.gov.au/~/media/publications/greenhouse-report/nger-streamlining-protocol.pdf)

‘Energy production’ is defined in NGER Regulation 2.23: Production of energy, in relation to a facility, means any one of the following: (a) the extraction or capture of energy from natural sources for **final consumption** by or from the operation of the facility or for use other than in operation of the facility; (b) the manufacture of energy by the conversion of energy from one form to another form for **final consumption** by or from the operation of the facility or for use other than in the operation of the facility.

#### Violation and Interpretation – the affirmative does not encourage individual personal behavior to increase use of solar, wind, coal, oil, nuclear, or natural gas.

#### Voting issue

1. – Limits – there are an infinite number of ways to talk about energy. Energy flows through us – energy is part of everything in life – narrow specific limits help provide an informed discussion so that both sides can come to the table to adequately discuss the topic at hand
2. Activist education – a limited set of discussion about what principles and strategies work can produce a successful set of information for future activists. When environmental justice conferences and activist meetings happen – there are agendas. People identify clearly what they
3. Extra topicality is a unique voting issue – it proves the resolution alone is insufficient to address the problem and provides the affirmative with unpredictable ground.

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Our interpretation of debate is that the 1AC must defend implementation of a resolutional policy enacted by the United States Federal Government.

**Definitional support ---**

**A. “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum**

**Army Officer School ‘04**

(5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, <http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm>)

The colon introduces the following: a. A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b. A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c. A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d. A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e. After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f. The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g. A *formal* resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

**B. “United States Federal Government should” means the debate is solely about the outcome of a policy established by governmental means**

**Ericson ‘03**

(Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb *should*—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, *should adopt* here **means to put a** program or **policy into action though governmental means**. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The **entire debate** is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

Advantage 1 is Limits:

A. There are an infinite number of competing frameworks to evaluate a debate

Mearsheimer 1995 (John, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, International Security, Winter 94/95)

In fact, change is always possible with critical theory because it allows for an unlimited number of discourses. And it makes no judgment about the merit or staying power of any particular one. Also, critical theory *makes* no judgment about whether human beings are “hard-wired” to be good or bad, but instead treats people as infinitely changeable. The key to how they think and behave is the particular “software program” that individuals carry around in their heads, and those can be changed. In essence, critical theorists hope to replace the widely used realist software package with new software that emphasizes communitarian norms. Once that switch has been made, states will cooperate with each other and world politics will be more peaceful.

B. We need closure to deliberate about the substance of the aff

Ruth Lesl Shively, Professor of Politics at Texas A&M, 2K [*Partisan Politics and Political Theory*, p. 181-2]

In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperfect. We agree on some matters but not on others, on generalities but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications, and so on. And this kind of limited agreement is the starting condition of contest and debate. As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. There can be no agreement except on the premise, and within a context, of agreement. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, we cannot argue about something if we are not communicating: if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument. At the very least, we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it. For instance, one cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one’s target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested. Registers, demonstrators, and debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and/or terms of their disagreements. The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator’s audience must know what is being resisted. In short, the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it. In other words, contestation rests on some basic agreement or harmony.

C. Deliberative argument is key to prevent oppression and violence. Their idea of total inclusion reproduces domination.

Tonn 5 – Mari Boor Tonn, Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Maryland, “Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public” Rhetoric& Public Affairs Vol. 8, No. 3

This widespread recognition that access to public deliberative processes and the ballot is a baseline of any genuine democracy points to the most curious irony of the conversation movement: portions of its constituency. Numbering among the most fervid dialogic loyalists have been some feminists and multiculturalists who represent groups historically denied both the right to speak in public and the ballot. Oddly, some feminists who championed the slogan “The Personal Is Political” to emphasize ways relational power can oppress tend to ignore similar dangers lurking in the appropriation of conversation and dialogue in public deliberation. Yet the conversational model’s emphasis on empowerment through intimacy can duplicate the power networks that traditionally excluded females and nonwhites and gave rise to numerous, sometimes necessarily uncivil, demands for democratic inclusion. Formalized participation structures in deliberative processes obviously cannot ensure the elimination of relational power blocs, but, as Freeman pointed out, the absence of formal rules leaves relational power unchecked and potentially capricious. Moreover, the privileging of the self, personal experiences, and individual perspectives of reality intrinsic in the conversational paradigm mirrors justifications once used by dominant groups who used their own lives, beliefs, and interests as templates for hegemonic social premises to oppress women, the lower class, and people of color. Paradigms infused with the therapeutic language of emotional healing and coping likewise flirt with the type of psychological diagnoses once ascribed to disaffected women. But as Betty Friedan’s landmark 1963 The Feminist Mystique argued, the cure for female alienation was neither tranquilizers nor attitude adjustments fostered through psychotherapy but, rather, unrestricted opportunities.102 The price exacted by promoting approaches to complex public issues— models that cast conventional deliberative processes, including the marshaling of evidence beyond individual subjectivity, as “elitist” or “monologic”—can be steep. Consider comments of an aide to President George W. Bush made before reports concluding Iraq harbored no weapons of mass destruction, the primary justification for a U.S.-led war costing thousands of lives. Investigative reporters and other persons sleuthing for hard facts, he claimed, operate “in what we call the reality-based community.” Such people “believe that solutions emerge from [the] judicious study of discernible reality.” Then baldly flexing the muscle afforded by increasingly popular social-constructionist and poststructuralist models for conflict resolution, he added: “That’s not the way the world really works anymore . . . We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you’re studying that reality— judiciously, as you will—we’ll act again, creating other new realities.”103 The recent fascination with public conversation and dialogue most likely is a product of frustration with the tone of much public, political discourse. Such concerns are neither new nor completely without merit. Yet, as Burke insightfully pointed out nearly six decades ago, “A perennial embarrassment in liberal apologetics has arisen from its ‘surgical’ proclivity: its attempt to outlaw a malfunction by outlawing the function.” The attempt to eliminate flaws in a process by eliminating the entire process, he writes, “is like trying to eliminate heart disease by eliminating hearts.”104 Because public argument and deliberative processes are the “heart” of true democracy, supplanting those models with social and therapeutic conversation and dialogue jeopardizes the very pulse and lifeblood of democracy itself.

Advantage 2 is Policy Education

A. Switch Side debate and policy simulation key to activism training

Joyner ‘99 – Professor of International Law in the Government Department at Georgetown University

(Christopher C., Spring, 199, 5 ILSA J Int'l & Comp L 377)

Use of the debate can be an effective pedagogical tool for education in the social sciences. Debates, like other role-playing simulations, help students understand different perspectives on a policy issue by adopting a perspective as their own. But, unlike other simulation games, debates do not require that a student participate directly in order to realize the benefit of the game. Instead of developing policy alternatives and experiencing the consequences of different choices in a traditional role-playing game, debates present the alternatives and consequences in a formal, rhetorical fashion before a judgmental audience. Having the class audience serve as jury helps each student develop a well-thought-out opinion on the issue by providing contrasting facts and views and enabling audience members to pose challenges to each debating team. These debates ask undergraduate students to examine the international legal implications of various United States foreign policy actions. Their chief tasks are to assess the aims of the policy in question, determine their relevance to United States national interests, ascertain what legal principles are involved, and conclude how the United States policy in question squares with relevant principles of international law. Debate questions are formulated as resolutions, along the lines of: "Resolved: The United States should deny most-favored-nation status to China on human rights grounds;" or "Resolved: The United States should resort to military force to ensure inspection of Iraq's possible nuclear, chemical and biological weapons facilities;" or "Resolved: The United States' invasion of Grenada in 1983 was a lawful use of force;" or "Resolved: The United States should kill Saddam Hussein." In addressing both sides of these legal propositions, the student debaters must consult the vast literature of international law, especially the nearly 100 professional law-school-sponsored international law journals now being published in the United States. This literature furnishes an incredibly rich body of legal analysis that often treats topics affecting United States foreign policy, as well as other more esoteric international legal subjects. Although most of these journals are accessible in good law schools, they are largely unknown to the political science community specializing in international relations, much less to the average undergraduate. By assessing the role of international law in United States foreign policy- making, students realize that United States actions do not always measure up to international legal expectations; that at times, international legal strictures get compromised for the sake of perceived national interests, and that concepts and principles of international law, like domestic law, can be interpreted and twisted in order to justify United States policy in various international circumstances. In this way, the debate format gives students the benefits ascribed to simulations and other action learning techniques, in that it makes them become actively engaged with their subjects, and not be mere passive consumers. Rather than spectators, students become legal advocates, observing, reacting to, and structuring political and legal perceptions to fit the merits of their case. The debate exercises carry several specific educational objectives. First, students on each team must work together to refine a cogent argument that compellingly asserts their legal position on a foreign policy issue confronting the United States. In this way, they gain greater insight into the real-world legal dilemmas faced by policy makers. Second, as they work with other members of their team, they realize the complexities of applying and implementing international law, and the difficulty of bridging the gaps between United States policy and international legal principles, either by reworking the former or creatively reinterpreting the latter. Finally, research for the debates forces students to become familiarized with contemporary issues on the United States foreign policy agenda and the role that international law plays in formulating and executing these policies. 8 The debate thus becomes an excellent vehicle for pushing students beyond stale arguments over principles into the real world of policy analysis, political critique, and legal defense.

Advantage 3 is Fairness:

A. They moot our best ground by avoiding USFG action. No topic disads link to two debaters’ opinions towards the Middle East.

B. No role for the negative – criticisms of the USFG are neg ground. In order to produce clash they essentially force us to endorse the resolution. This means they are extra topical and that you should vote neg on presumption

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**Their focus on liberation requires re-affirmation of a distinction between “human” and “animal” – re-entrenches specieism**

**Kim**, UC Irvine political science professor, **2009**

(Claire, “Slaying the Beast:  Reflections on Race, Culture, and Species”, http://aapf.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/kalfou.pdf)

Dyson gives a perfunctory nod to the animal question and then turns to focus on the issue of truemoral significance and urgency: racism. It is as if defending the humanity of Black people requires **reaffirming the animality of animals**, their **categorical subordination**. Similarly, feminist Sandra Kobin asks why Vick was treated more harshly than professional athletes who beat their wives and girlfriends, writing: “Beat a woman? Play on; Beat a dog? You’re gone” (Kobin 2007). Kobin does not critique dog fighting for its promotion of masculinist violence or show any appreciation of the fact that women and animals are both victims of male violence. Instead, she bristles at the idea that dogs might be valued more than women and insists that women are the victims that really matter. What is troubling about the racial persecution narrative advanced by Vick’s defenders is not that it is wrong per se but that it **subsumes**, deflects, and ultimately denies the other moral question being raised, the animal question. Its response to the interdependency of Blackness and animalness in the white imagination is not to deconstruct both notions but rather to vigorously affirm that Blacks are human and therefore **deserving of better treatment than animals**. It is a narrative that embraces an ideology of **human supremacy in the name of fighting white supremacy** and sees no contradiction in this position. It is as if Dyson and Kobin are saying that people of color and women have the most at stake in reinscribing the impassable line between humans and animals, whereas these groups may in fact have the most at stake in its erasure. Most humans are unaccustomed to thinking about how their politics reinscribe notions of human superiority over all other species, but the notion of species-free space is as improbable as that of race-free space. **Categories of difference saturate our thinking, our discourse, our experience, and our actions.**

**Speciesism makes possible “systematic beastilization” which justifies non-criminal putting to death of the other—root cause of all oppression**

**Rossini**, postdoctoral Fellow ASCA, **2006**

(Manuela, “To the Dogs: Companion speciesism and the new feminist materialism”, text and image Volume 3, September, <http://intertheory.org/rossini>)

What is equally sobering, however, is the fact that the most radical metaposthumanists (and the humanities more broadly) do not quite manage to make an epistemological break with liberal humanism, insofar as their writing is also marked by an unquestioned “speciesism”; i.e., in the definition of ethicist Peter Singer who popularised the term three decades ago in his book *Animal Liberation*, “a prejudice or attitude of bias in favour of the interests of members of one’s own species and against those of members of other species.” Both postcolonial, feminist and queer theories and discussion of subjectivity, identity, and difference as well as the claims on the right to freedom by new social movements have recourse to an Enlightenment concept of the subject whose *conditio sine qua non* is the absolute control of that subject over the life of nonhuman others/objects. The rhetorical strategy of radically separating non-white, non-male and non-heterosexual human beings from animals in order to have the subject status of these members of the human species recognised was and is successful and also legitimate – given that the racist, sexist and homophobic discourse of animality or an animalistic „nature“ has hitherto served to exclude most individuals of those groups of people from many privileges – but the speciesist logic of the dominance of human animals over nonhuman animals has remained in place. If we fight racism and (hetero)sexism because we declare discrimination on the basis of specific and identifiable characteristics – such as “black“, “woman” or “lesbian“ to be wrong and unjust, then we should also vehemently oppose the exploitation, imprisoning, killing and eating of nonhuman animals on the basis of their species identity. Moreover, if our research and teaching as cultural critics endeavours to do justice to the diversity of human experience and life styles and feel responsible towards marginalised others, should we then not seriously think about Cary Wolfe’s question „how must our work itself change when the other to which it tries to do justice is no longer human?“ Wolfe is not making a claim for animal rights here – at least not primarily. This is also why his book puns on “rites/rights“: *Animal Rites* is the intervention of the anti-speciesist cultural critic who scrutinizes the rituals that human beings form around the figures of animals, including the literary and cinematic enactments of cannibalism, monstrosity and normativity. Wolfe subsumes all of these stagings under the heading *the discourse of species*, with “discourse“ understood in the sense of Michel Foucault as not only a rhetoric but above all as the condition for the production and ordering of meaning and knowledge in institutions like medicine, the law, the church, the family or universities. In addition, Wolfe wants to sharpen our awareness that a speciesist metaphysics has also **a deadly impact on *human* animals**, especially because speciesism is grounded in the juridical state apparatus: “the full transcendence of the ‘**human‘ requires the sacrifice of the ‘animal‘** and the animalistic, which in turn makes possible a symbolic economy in which we engage in what Derrida [calls] **a ‚non-criminal putting to death‘ of other *humans* as well by marking *them* as animal**.“ The dog lies buried in the singular: “The animal – what a word!”, Derrida exclaims: “[t]he animal is a word, it is an appellation that men have instituted, a name they have given themselves the right and authority to give to another living creature [*à l'autre vivant*].” In order to problematise this naming, Derrida has created the neologism *l'animot*: I would like to have the plural of animals heard in the singular. […] We have to envisage the existence of ‘living creatures’ whose plurality cannot be assembled within the single figure of an animality that is simply opposed to humanity. […] The suffix *mot* in *l’animot* should bring us back to the word […]. It opens onto the referential experience of the thing as such, as what it is in its being, and therefore to the reference point by means of which one has always sought to draw the limit, the unique and indivisible limit held to separate man from animal. As I propose in what follows, this clearly defined caesura of the „anthropological machine”, which according to Giorgio Agamben was already set in motion by the old Greeks and the messianic thinkers and then accelerated by scientific taxonomies and the birth of anthropology, can be bridged with the help of a zoontological approach and *companion speciesism*. Posthumanist zoontologies The desperate cry of the historical person Joseph Carey Merrick (in the movie *The Elephant Man* of 1980), “I am not an animal! I am a human being! I...am...a man!” – for recognition of his human identity through which he claims his right to social integration and personal integrity, is very understandable and hurts. But his words nevertheless reflect the poverty of the humanist stance, insofar as traditional humanism can only secure the “proper” essence of *humanitas* via a rigid separation from *animalitas*. If one reads the reports by the victims and witnesses of the tortures in the military prison of Abu Ghraib, it seems to me that it is precisely the continued insistence and reinforcement of the animal-human boundary that legitimises the committed atrocities: Some of the things they did was make me sit down like a dog, … and … bark like a dog and they were laughing at me … One of the police was telling me to crawl … A few days before [this], … the guy who wears glasses, he put red woman's underwear over my head … pissing on me and laughing on me … he put a part of his stick … inside my ass … she was playing with my dick … And they were taking pictures of me during all these instances. … [Another prisoner] was forced to insert a finger into his anus and lick it. He was also forced tolick and chew a shoe. … He was then told to insert his finger in his nose during questioning … his other arm in the air. The Arab interpreter told him he looked like an elephant. [They were] given badges with the letter ‘C’ on it. The US soldiers reduce their prisoners to their corporeal being, to animal being, and then make fun of this “bare life“ Instead of accepting their own vulnerability and mortality that they share with their victims as well as with other living beings, the torturers use the “systematic bestialization“ of the prisoners to strengthen their own sense of freedom and autonomy and to concomitantly withdraw the right to protection guaranteed by the humanitarian rights of the Geneva Conventions; after all, as barking dogs, crawling insects and ‘elephant men’, these ‘creatures’ cannot respond to the name, the word, the interpellation “human.“ The implicit and explicit analogies between racism, sexism, homophobia that accompany the above description of the torture methods, confirm that the power of the “discourse of species” to affect *human* others depends on **the prior acceptance of** the institution “**speciesism**;” i.e. on taking for granted that the inflicting of pain and the killing of nonhuman animals by human animals does not constitute a criminal act but, on the contrary, is legal. This is why Derrida speaks of the “carnophallogocentrism“ of Western metaphysics. And here Wolfe’s argument comes full circle: [Since] the humanist discourse of species will always be available for use by some humans against other humans as well, to countenance violence against the social other of *whatever species* – or gender, or race, or class, or sexual difference. . . we need to understand that the ethical and philosophical urgency of confronting the institution of speciesism and crafting a posthumanist theory of the subject *has nothing to do with whether you like animals*. We all, human and nonhuman alike, have a stake in the discourse and institution of speciesism; it is by no means limited to its overwhelmingly direct and disproportionate effects on animals.

**The alternative is to embrace the standpoint of the animal—this overcomes the humanist bias of the affirmative scholarship, connects the experiences of human and non-human animals and allows for total liberation by providing understanding of all oppression**

**Best**, UT El Paso philosophy professor, **2009**

(Steven, “The Rise of Critical Animal Studies: Putting Theory into Action and Animal Liberation into Higher Education “, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume VII, Issue 1, 2009, http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/JCAS/Journal\_Articles\_download/issue\_9/JCAS%20VII%20Issue%201%20MAY%20ISSUE%20The%20Rise%20of%20Critical%20Animal%20Studies%20pgs%209-52.pdf)

Postmodern critiques have been hugely influential in many theoretical strains of animal studies, but theorists could not employ the insights of postmodernism without overcoming their **limitations**. This is crucial for two reasons. First, deconstructionists and social constructionists are typically speciesists and dogmatic humanists (even those who deconstruct “humanism”!) who rarely challenge the human/animal dichotomy and analyze how it is used to advance false views of all animal, human and nonhuman. Second, they fail to see that the human/animal opposition underpins oppositions between reason/emotions, thought/body, men/women, white/black, and Western/non-Western. Yet as noted by theorists (e.g., Keith Thomas, Jim Mason, and Charles Patterson)9 with broader optics and more inclusive theories than humanism, speciesism and animal domestication provided the conceptual template and social practice whereby humans begin to clearly distinguish between “human rationality” and “animal irrationality.”10 Animals – defined as “brute beasts” lacking “rationality” – thereby provided the moral basement into which one could eject women, people of color, and other humans deemed to be subhuman or deficient in (Western male) “humanity.” Whereas nearly all histories, even so-called “radical” narratives, have been written from the human standpoint, a growing number of theorists have broken free of the speciesist straightjacket to examine history and society from the standpoint of (nonhuman) animals. This approach, as I define it, considers the interaction between human and nonhuman animals – past, present, and future -- and the need for profound changes in the way humans define themselves and relate to other sentient species and to the natural world as a whole. What I call the “animal standpoint” examines the origins and development of societies through the dynamic, symbiotic interrelationship between human and nonhuman animals. It therefore interprets history not from an evolutionary position that reifies human agency as the autonomous actions of a Promethean species, but rather from a co-evolutionary perspective that sees nonhuman animals as inseparably embedded in human history and as dynamic agents in their own right.11 The animal standpoint seeks to illuminate the origins and development of dominator cultures, to preserve the wisdom and heritage of egalitarian values and social relations, and to discern what moral and social progress means in a far deeper sense than what is discernible through humanist historiography, anthropology, social theory, and philosophy. However “critical,” “subversive,” “groundbreaking,” or “radical” their probing of historical and social dynamics, very **few theorists have managed to see beyond the humanist bias** in order to adopt a proper analytical and moral relation to other animals; **they have failed**, in other words, to grasp the importance of nonhuman animals in human life, the profound ways in which the domination of humans over other animals creates conflict and disequilibrium in human relations to one another and to the Earth as a whole. Thus, the animal standpoint seeks generally to illuminate human biological and social evolution in important new ways, such as reveal the origins, dynamics, and development of dominator cultures, social hierarchies, economic and political inequalities, and asymmetrical systems of power that are violent and destructive to everything they touch. Providing perspectives and insights **unattainable** through other historical approaches, the animal standpoint analyzes how the domination of humans over nonhuman animals is intimately linked to the domination of humans over one another, as it also brings to light the environmental impact of large-scale animal slaughter and exploitation. A key thesis of animal standpoint theory is that nonhuman animals have been **key driving and shaping forces of human thought, psychology, moral and social life,** and history overall, and that in fundamental ways, the oppression of human over human is rooted in the oppression of human over nonhuman animal. Animal standpoint theory thus leads us ineluctably to understanding the commonalities of oppression, and hence to alliance politics and the systemic revolutionary viewpoint of **total liberation**.12 It demonstrates – would that dogmatic Left, eco-humanists, and so-called “environmentalists” take note! -- the profound importance of veganism and the animal rights/liberation movement for human liberation, peace and justice, and ecological healing and balance.

### 1nc

**The 1AC becomes an alibi for acquiescence of class struggles – they obscure the logic of capital and ensure repetition of oppression**

**Zavarzadeh 94** (Mas'Ud, The Stupidity That Consumption Is Just as Productive as Production": In the Shopping Mall of the Post-al Left," College Literature, Vol. 21, No. 3, The Politics of Teaching Literature 2 (Oct., 1994),pp. 92-114)

Post-al logic is marked above all by its erasure of "production" as the determining force in organizing human societies and their institutions, and its insistence on "consumption" and "distribution" as the driving force of the social.5 The argument of the post-al left (briefly) is that "labor," in advanced industrial "democracies," is superseded by "information," and consequently "knowledge" (not class struggle over the rate of surplus labor) has become the driving force of history. The task of the post-al left is to deconstruct the "metaphysics of labor" and consequently to announce the end of socialism and with it the "outdatedness" of the praxis of abolishing private property (that is, congealed alienated labor) in the post-al moment. Instead of abolishing private property, an enlightened radical democracy which is to supplant socialism (as Laclau, Mouffe, Aronowitz, Butler, and others have advised) should make property holders of each citizen. The post-al left rejects the global objective conditions of production for the local subjective circumstances of consumption, and its master trope is what R-4 [France] so clearly foregrounds: the (shopping) "mall"?the ultimate site of consumption "with all latest high-tech textwares" deployed to pleasure the "body." In fact, the post-al left has "invented" a whole new interdiscipline called "cultural studies" that provides the new alibi for the regime of profit by shifting social analytics from "production" to "consumption." (On the political economy of "invention" in ludic theory, see Transformation 2 on "The Invention of the Queer.") To prove its "progressiveness," the post-al left devotes most of its energies (see the writings of John Fiske, Constance Penley, Michael Berube, Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Andrew Ross, Susan Willis, Stuart Hall, Fredric Jameson), to demonstrate how "consumption" is in fact an act of production and resistance to capitalism and a practice in which a Utopian vision for a society of equality is performed! The shift from "production" to "consumption" manifests itself in post-al left theories through the focus on "superstructural" cultural analysis and the preoccupation not with the "political economy" ("base") but with "representation"? for instance, of race, sexuality, environment, ethnicity, nationality, and identity. This is, for example, one reason for [Hill's] ridiculing the "base" and "superstructure" analytical model of classical Marxism (Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy) with an anecdote (the privileged mode of "argument" for the post-al left) that the base is really not all that "basic." To adhere to the base/superstructure model for [him] is to be thrown into an "epistemological gulag." For the post-al left a good society is, therefore, one in which, as [France] puts it, class antagonism is bracketed and the "surplus value" is distributed more evenly among men and women, whites and persons of color, the lesbian and the straight. It is not a society in which "surplus value"?the exploitative appropriation of the other's labor-is itself eliminated by revolutionary praxis. The post-al left's good society is not one in which private ownership is obsolete and the social division of labor (class) is abolished. Rather it is a society in which the fruit of exploitation of the proletariat (surplus labor) is more evenly distributed and a near-equality of consumption is established. This distributionist/consumptionist theory that underwrites the economic interests of the (upper)middle classes is the foundation for all the texts in this exchange and their pedagogies. A good pedagogy in these texts therefore is one in which power is distributed evenly in the classroom: a pedagogy that constructs a classroom of consensus not antagonism (thus opposition to "politicizing the classroom" in OR-1 [Hogan]) and in which knowledge (concept) is turned through the process that OR-3 [McCormick] calls "translation"?into "consumable" EXPERIENCES. The more "intense" the experience, as the anecdotes of [McCormick] show, the more successful the pedagogy. In short, it is a pedagogy that removes the student from his/her position in the social relations of production and places her/him in the personal relation of consumption: specifically, EXPERIENCE of/as the consumption of pleasure. The post-al logic **obscures** the laws of motion of capital by very specific assumptions and moves-many of which are rehearsed in the texts here. I will discuss some of these, mention others in passing, and hint at several more. (I have provided a full account of all these moves in my "Post-ality" in Transformation 1.) I begin by outlining the post-al assumptions that "democracy" is a never-ending, open "dialogue" and "conversation" among multicultural citizens; that the source of social inequities is "power"; that a post-class hegemonic "coalition," as OR-5 [Williams] calls it-and not class struggle-is the dynamics of social change; that truth (as R-l [Hill] writes) is an "epistemological gulag"? a construct of power and thus any form of "ideology critique" that raises questions of "falsehood" and "truth" ("false consciousness") does so through a violent exclusion of the "other" truths by, in [Williams'] words, "staking sole legitimate claim" to the truth in question. Given the injunction of the post-al logic against binaries (truth/falsehood), the project of "epistemology" is displaced in the ludic academy by "rhetoric." The question, consequently, becomes not so much what is the "truth" of a practice but whether it "works." (Rhetoric has always served as an alibi for pragmatism.) Therefore, [France] is not interested in whether my practices are truthful but in what effects they might have: if College Literature publishes my texts would such an act (regardless of the "truth" of my texts) end up "cutting our funding?" [he] asks. A post-al leftist like [France], in short, "resists" the state only in so far as the state does not cut [his] "funding." Similarly, it is enough for a cynical pragmatist like [Williams] to conclude that my argument "has little prospect of effectual force" in order to disregard its truthfulness. The post-al dismantling of "epistemology" and the erasure of the question of "truth," it must be pointed out, is undertaken to protect the economic interests of the ruling class. If the "truth question" is made to seem outdated and an example of an orthodox binarism ([Hill]), any conclusions about the truth of ruling class practices are excluded from the scene of social contestation as a violent logocentric (positivistic) totalization that disregards the "difference" of the ruling class. This is why a defender of the ruling class such as [Hill] sees an ideology critique aimed at unveiling false consciousness and the production of class consciousness as a form of "epistemological spanking." It is this structure of assumptions that enables [France] to answer my question, "What is wrong with being dogmatic?" not in terms of its truth but by reference to its pragmatics (rhetoric): what is "wrong" with dogmatism, [he] says, is that it is violent rhetoric ("textual Chernobyl") and thus Stalinist. If I ask what is wrong with Stalinism, again (in terms of the logic of [his] text) I will not get a political or philosophical argument but a tropological description.6 The post-al left is a New Age Left: the "new new left" privileged by [Hill] and [Williams]- the laid-back, "sensitive," listening, and dialogic left of coalitions, voluntary work, and neighborhood activism (more on these later). It is, as I will show, anti-intellectual and populist; its theory is "bite size" (mystifying, of course, who determines the "size" of the "bite"), and its model of social change is anti-conceptual "spontaneity": May 68, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and, in [Hill's] text, Chiapas. In the classroom, the New Age post-al pedagogy inhibits any critique of the truth of students' statements and instead offers, as [McCormick] makes clear, a "counseling," through anecdotes, concerning feelings. The rejection of "truth" (as "epistemological gulag"?[Hill]), is accompanied by the rejection of what the post-al left calls "economism." Furthermore, the post-al logic relativizes subjectivities, critiques functionalist explanation, opposes "determinism," and instead of closural readings, offers supplementary ones. It also celebrates eclecticism; puts great emphasis on the social as discourse and on discourse as always inexhaustible by any single interpretation? discourse (the social) always "outruns" and "exceeds" its explanation. Post-al logic is, in fact, opposed to any form of "explanation" and in favor of mimetic description: it regards "explanation" to be the intrusion of a violent outside and "description" to be a respectful, caring attention to the immanent laws of signification (inside). This notion of description which has by now become a new dogma in ludic feminist theory under the concept of "mimesis" (D. Cornell, Beyond Accommodation)?regards politics to be always immanent to practices: thus the banalities about not politicizing the classroom in [Hogan's] "anarchist" response to my text7 and the repeated opposition to binaries in all nine texts. The opposition to binaries is, in fact, an **ideological alibi for erasing class struggle**, as is quite clear in [France's] rejection of the model of a society "divided by two antagonistic classes" (see my Theory and its Other).

**The aff’s approach to knowledge which privileges subjectivity and uncertainty denies the objectivity in class relations and the oppression that is produced from capital accumulation**

**Zavarzadeh 94** (Mas'Ud, The Stupidity That Consumption Is Just as Productive as Production": In the Shopping Mall of the Post-al Left," College Literature, Vol. 21, No. 3, The Politics of Teaching Literature 2 (Oct., 1994), pp. 92-114)

**The unsurpassable objectivity** which is **not open** to rhetorical **interpretation** and constitutes the decided foundation of critique is the "outside" that Marx calls the "Working Day" (Capital 1: 340-416). ([France] willfully misrecognizes my notion of objectivity by confusing my discussion of identity politics and objectivity.) The working day is not what it seems: its reality, like the reality of all capitalist practices, is an alienated reality-there is a contradiction between its appearance and its essence. It "appears" as if the worker, during the working day, receives wages that are equal compensation for his labor. This mystification originates in the fact that the capitalist pays not for "labor" but for "labor power": when labor power is put to use it produces more than it is paid for. The "working day" is the site of the unfolding of this fundamental contradiction: it is a divided day, divided into "necessary labor" the part in which the worker produces value equivalent to his wages and the "other," the part of "surplus labor"?a part in which the worker works for free and produces "surplus value." The second part of the working day is the source of profit and accumulation of capital. "Surplus labor" is the OBJECTIVE FACT of capitalist relations of production: without "surplus labor" there will be no profit, and without profit there will be no accumulation of capital, and without accumulation of capital there will be no capitalism. The goal of bourgeois economics is to conceal this part of the working day, and it should therefore be no surprise that, as a protector of ruling class interests in the academy, [Hill], with a studied casualness, places "surplus value" in the adjacency of "radical bible-studies" and quietly turns it into a rather boring matter of interest perhaps only to the dogmatic. To be more concise: "surplus labor" is that **objective, unsurpassable "outside**" that cannot be made part of the economies of the "inside" without capitalism itself being transformed into socialism. Revolutionary critique is grounded in this truth-objectivity-since all social institutions and practices of capitalism are founded upon the objectivity of surplus labor. The role of a revolutionary pedagogy of critique is to produce class consciousness so as to assist in organizing people into a new vanguard party that aims at abolishing this FACT of the capitalist system and trans-forming capitalism into a communist society. As I have argued in my "Postality" [Transformation 1], (post)structuralist theory, through the concept of "representation," makes all such facts an effect of interpretation and turns them into "undecidable" processes. The boom in ludic theory and Rhetoric Studies in the bourgeois academy is caused by the service it renders the ruling class: it makes the OBJECTIVE reality of the extraction of surplus labor a subjective one-not a decided fact but a matter of "interpretation." In doing so, it "deconstructs" (see the writings of such bourgeois readers as Gayatri Spivak, Cornel West, and Donna Haraway) the labor theory of value, displaces production with consumption, and resituates the citizen from the revolutionary cell to the ludic shopping mall of [France].

**The denial of the objective suffering that capitalism naturalizes violence and makes us indifferent toward limitless annihilation**

**Zavarzadeh 94** (Mas'Ud, The Stupidity That Consumption Is Just as Productive as Production": In the Shopping Mall of the Post-al Left," College Literature, Vol. 21, No. 3, The Politics of Teaching Literature 2 (Oct., 1994),pp. 92-114)

What is **obscured** in this representation of the non-dialogical is, of course, the violence of the dialogical. I leave aside here the violence with which these advocates of non-violent conversations attack me in their texts and cartoon. My concern is with the practices by which the post-al left, through dialogue, **naturalizes** (and eroticizes) the violence that keeps capitalist democracy in power. What is violent? Subjecting people to the **daily terrorism** of layoffs in order to maintain high rates of profit for the owners of the means of production or redirecting this violence (which gives annual bonuses, in addition to multi-million-dollar salaries, benefits, and stock options, to the CEOs of the very corporations that are laying off thousands of workers) against the ruling class in order to end class societies? What is violent? Keeping millions of people in poverty, hunger, starvation, and homelessness, and deprived of basic health care, at a time when the forces of production have reached a level that can, in fact, provide for the needs of all people, or trying to overthrow this system? What is violent? Placing in office, under the alibi of "free elections," post fascists (Italy) and allies of the ruling class (Major, Clinton, Kohl, Yeltsin) or struggling to end this farce? What is violent? Reinforcing these practices by "talking" about them in a "reasonable" fashion (that is, within the rules of the game established by the ruling class for limited reform from "within") or marking the violence of conversation and its complicity with the status quo, there by breaking the frame that represents "dialogue" as participation, when in fact it is merely a formal strategy for legitimating the established order? Any society in which the labor of many is the source of wealth for the few-all class societies-is a **society of violence**, and no amount of "talking" is going to change that **objective fact.** "Dialogue" and "conversation" are aimed at arriving at a consensus by which this violence is made more **tolerable, justifiable, and naturalized.**

#### Vote negative to endorse a political strategy that withdraws from capitalist relations

#### Universal Rejection is key – it’s the only way to hollow out capitalist structures – the debate should be a question of competing methodologies – The primary question of the ballot should be affirming an ethical orientation that best organizes against capitalist relations

Herod 4 renowned philosopher, author, and social activist

(James, “Getting Free”, <http://site.www.umb.edu/faculty/salzman_g/Strate/GetFre/06.htm>, accessed 8/6/09)

It is time to try to describe, at first abstractly and later concretely, a strategy for destroying capitalism. This strategy, at its most basic, calls for pulling time, energy, and resources out of capitalist civilization and putting them into building a new civilization. The image then is one of emptying out capitalist structures, hollowing them out, by draining wealth, power, and meaning out of them until there is nothing left but shells**.** This is definitely an aggressive strategy. It requires great militancy, and constitutes an attack on the existing order.The strategy clearly recognizes that capitalism is the enemy and must be destroyed, but it is not a frontal attack aimed at overthrowing the system, but an inside attack aimed at gutting it, while simultaneously replacing it with something better, something we want. Thus capitalist structures (corporations, governments, banks, schools, etc.) are not seized so much as simply abandoned. Capitalist relations are not fought so much as they are simply rejected. We stop participating in activities that support (finance, condone) the capitalist world and start participating in activities that build a new world while simultaneously undermining the old. We create a new pattern of social relations alongside capitalist relations and then we continually build and strengthen our new pattern while doing every thing we can to weaken capitalist relations. In this way our new democratic, non-hierarchical, non-commodified relations can eventually overwhelm the capitalist relations and force them out of existence**.** This is how it has to be done. This is a plausible, realistic strategy**.** To think that we could create a whole new world of decent social arrangements overnight, in the midst of a crisis, during a so-called revolution, or during the collapse of capitalism, is foolhardy**.** Our new social world must grow within the old, and in opposition to it, until it is strong enough to dismantle and abolish capitalist relations. Such a revolution will never happen automatically, blindly, determinably, because of the inexorable, materialist laws of history. It will happen, and only happen, because we want it to, and because we know what we’re doing and know how we want to live, and know what obstacles have to be overcome before we can live that way, and know how to distinguish between our social patterns and theirs. But we must not think that the capitalist world can simply be ignored, in a live and let live attitude, while we try to build new lives elsewhere. (There is no elsewhere.) There is at least one thing, wage-slavery, that we can’t imply stop participating in (but even here there are ways we can chip away at it). Capitalism must be explicitly refused and replaced by something else. This constitutes War, but it is not a war in the traditional sense of armies and tanks, but a war fought on a daily basis, on the level of everyday life, by millions of people. It is a war nevertheless because the accumulators of capital will use coercion, brutality, and murder, as they have always done in the past, to try to block any rejection of the system. They have always had to force compliance; they will not hesitate to continue doing so. Nevertheless, there are many concrete ways that individuals, groups, and neighborhoods can gut capitalism, which I will enumerate shortly. We must always keep in mind how we became slaves; then we can see more clearly how we can cease being slaves**.** We were forced into wage-slavery because the ruling class slowly, systematically, and brutally destroyed our ability to live autonomously. By driving us off the land, changing the property laws, destroying community rights, destroying our tools, imposing taxes, destroying our local markets**,** and so forth, we were forced onto the labor market in order to survive, our only remaining option being to sell, for a wage, our ability to work. It’s quite clear then how we can overthrow slavery. We must reverse this process. We must begin to reacquire the ability to live without working for a wage or buying the products made by wage-slaves (that is, we must get free from the labor market and the way of living based on it), and embed ourselves instead in cooperative labor and cooperatively produced goods. Another clarification is needed. This strategy does not call for reforming capitalism, for changing capitalism into something else. It calls for replacing capitalism, totally, with a new civilization. This is an important distinction, because capitalism has proved impervious to reforms, as a system. We can sometimes in some places win certain concessions from it (usually only temporary ones) and win some (usually short-lived) improvements in our lives as its victims, but we cannot reform it piecemeal, as a system. Thus our strategy of gutting and eventually destroying capitalism requires at a minimum a totalizing image, an awareness that we are attacking an entire way of life and replacing it with another, and not merely reforming one way of life into something else. Many people may not be accustomed to thinking about entire systems and social orders, but everyone knows what a lifestyle is, or a way of life, and that is the way we should approach it. The thing is this: in order for capitalism to be destroyed millions and millions of people must be dissatisfied with their way of life. They must want something else and see certain existing things as obstacles to getting what they want**.** It is not useful to think of this as a new ideology. It is not merely a belief-system that is needed, like a religion, or like Marxism, or Anarchism. Rather it is a new prevailing vision, a dominant desire, an overriding need. What must exist is a pressing desire to live a certain way, and not to live another way. If this pressing desire were a desire to live free, to be autonomous, to live in democratically controlled communities, to participate in the self-regulating activities of a mature people, then capitalism could be destroyed. Otherwise we are doomed to perpetual slavery and possibly even to extinction. The content of this vision is actually not new at all, but quite old. The long term goa**l** of communists, anarchists, and socialists has always been to restore community. Even the great peasant revolts of early capitalism sought to get free from external authorities and restore autonomy to villages. Marx defined communism once as a free association of producers, and at another time as a situation in which the free development of each is a condition for the free development of all**.** Anarchists have always called for worker and peasant self-managed cooperatives. The long term goals have always been clear: to abolish wage-slavery, to eradicate a social order organized solely around the accumulation of capital for its own sake, and to establish in its place a society of free people who democratically and cooperatively self-determine the shape of their social world**.**

### 1nc

#### Next off is the competition critique:

#### The affirmative chooses to engage in personalized politics in a competitive debate round by claiming to use their own personal form of labor to create social change.

#### This is counterproductive for 3 reasons

#### 1. Alliance splitting- personalizing debate risks splitting alliances and fracturing solutions, causing backlash and resistance:

**Zompetti ’04** [Joe, Assistant Professor, School of Communication, Illinois State

University, “Contemporary Argumentation and Debate”]

**The purpose of this essay is to outline what I strongly believe is a fundamental problem with recent debate techniques – the personalizing of debating. The intent is** not to isolate or overly criticize the arguments advanced by the University of Louisville specifically, but rather **to locate their arguments as a case study for how debate rounds have become highly personalized. Even before Louisville's project** (and certainly Louisville is not the only team that currently engages in this type of debating), **individuals and groups alike were personalizing debate arguments, making it difficult for opponents and judges to decipher, understand, analyze and come to grips with such arguments in a forum meant for hypothetical policy-making. In essence, the personalizing of debating has emerged wrought with frustrations, anxiety, resistance and backlash.**

#### 2. Structural solutions- personalized debating blocks structural solutions

**Zompetti ’04** [Joe, Assistant Professor, School of Communication, Illinois State University, “Contemporary Argumentation and Debate”]

To be sure, **many have embraced the idea to gain a strategic edge in competitive debate rounds as well as to be self-reflexive of their own participation in an activity that probably does need restructuring. However, the central problem of this new phenomenon – the personalizing of debating – is twofold: it victimizes debate, and it ignores deeper, perhaps more important structural problems within the debate community**.

#### 3. Debate rounds are bad forums- lack of time, moving advocacy target, and they deflect from community-wide discussions- turns the case

**Zompetti ’04** [Joe, Assistant Professor, School of Communication, Illinois State University, “Contemporary Argumentation and Debate”]

**The second major problem with this turn in contemporary policy debate is its deflection, if not downright rejection, of more fundamental or core problems which are the cause of marginalization. Dana Cloud** (1998) **poignantly argues that when focusing on the personalizing of "debating," society stifles dissent, which is probably more important and powerful at ushering-in social change than particularized attention to therapeutic, albeit victimized, perspectives. The will to engage in discourse about transgression is one of individualized therapy, as if the individual's psychological condition is at stake** (e.g., arguments about "discursive violence" are often deployed to this end). **Her argument is primarily one about key progressive change – should we focus on individual notions of psychological distress or the larger group's problem of resource-based scarcity and exploitation? If one is compelled by the argument that we should look self-reflexively2 and comprehensively at the nature of excluding debaters of color and other marginalized groups, then we might be tempted to agree with the outcome of piecemeal solutions** and incoherent policies. On the other hand, we may want to analyze how such relationships occurred and grew when other relationships and situations were not as obvious. In fact, **we may want to even broaden our interpretation of such relationships – exactly how are students of color marginalized? Why do folks believe they have nothing to contribute? Why do students of color feel excluded? It is very difficult**, if not impossible, **to get at these questions during a collegiate debate round. Not only is the limited time in a round an impediment at answering these complex questions, but both debaters of a single team may advance different personalized arguments, creating a moving target of advocacy that the opposing team and judges have difficulty in specifically pinning down for thorough and productive examination**. Or, as Cloud suggests, such therapeutic arguments "deflect [sic] the energy and radicalism of activists," essentially creating a shell-game during private discussions of much larger societal problems (1998, p. 34). In addition, **these questions are often skirted in debate rounds because there is a drive for competition**. While some critical self-reflection has undoubtedly occurred as a result of personalizing debate, **the overwhelming majority of debaters and coaches spend less time thinking about the core problems of marginalization** (and their solutions) **than they do locating debate strategies to beat personalization arguments at the next tournament**. During squad meetings and coaching sessions, one does not hear an opposing team sincerely talk about their privilege or the exclusion of women or people of color in the debate community. Instead, one hears about what topicality argument, framework argument, or counter-narrative will be deployed to win the judge's ballot. **The problem of therapeutic rhetoric underscores how personalized debating prevents examination of more important factors such as resource disparity**.

#### Our alternative is to reject the affirmative within the realm of a competitive debate round.

### case

Their assertion of language as only an act of resistance homogenizes African American culture undermining their performance

Mcclendon 2004 - John h. III, Bates College Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. 18, No. 4,. P.308-9

Additionally, the function of various forms of social stratification—especially the impact of class contradictions—harbors the real possibility for different ideological responses to commonly experienced conditions of life. In the manner of the Marxist conception of ideology, as found in The German Ideology, I presume that philosophy (ontology) is a form of ideology (Marx and Engels 1976). Hence, only on the presupposition that the African American community is socially homogeneous can it plausibly be argued that African Americans all share the same ontology. Given it is not the case that the African American community is homogeneous, then there is no plausible warranting for the belief that all African Americans share a common ontology. This leads directly to point three and my charge of Yancy’s (and Smitherman’s) vindicationism, where he argues that resistance to white supremacy is the defining characteristic of African American culture and hence language. When African American vindicationism is bereft of dialectical theory and method, as a determinate philosophical approach to African American culture, it neglects a very important aspect of the historical dialectic of African Ameri can culture, viz. that African American culture is not in any way a monolithically formed culture where there are only manifestations of resistance. There is more to African American history and culture than a continuous line of resistance to oppression, for, by way of example, not all African Americans sang the spirituals with an eye to joining the Underground Railroad (Fisher 1990). Some believed that freedom was wearing a robe in “heaben” and that washing in the blood of Jesus would make one “as white as the snow.” Or that loyalty to Massa was the highest virtue and resistance and revolt were of the greatest folly. The modern day connotation for “Uncle Tom” did not enter the lexicon of African American language without the historical presence of real, existing “Toms.” It is no accident that there is the current exercise in African American locution of playing on this word (Tom) whenever Supreme Court Justice, Clarence “Tomto- us” is mentioned among African American political speakers. After all, the historical record indicates that the failure of Gabriel Prosser’s, Denmark Vesey’s, and Nat Turner’s slave insurrections were due in part to other slaves that were more loyal to Massa than their own liberation. Mind you that those who ratted out the slave revolts shared in the same language, ate the same food, lived the same experiences, but also had a different worldview (conception of reality) and set of values. The idea that social ontology and identity among African Americans, past and present, are preeminently the same for all is the sort of reductionism that flattens out the cultural, social, political, and ideological landscape called African American culture. Albeit, resistance is cardinal and crucial to any description, definition, and interpretation of African American culture, nonetheless, it is not exhaustive of its actualities and even of its future possibilities. African American culture in its full substance and scope is more complex than a singular thrust in the monodirection of resistance. Rather, African American culture historically constitutes an ensemble of traditions in which we are able, for analytical purposes, to locate what are two primary and yet contradictory forms, viz. one of resistance and another of accommodation. This internal dialectic is undermined when a scenario of resistance sans accommodation gains support via vindicationism.

“The black vernacular” assumes a universal black identity that excludes African Americans who use separate ways of speech

Lynn **Clarke** 20**04 –** Communications Professor at the University of Pittsburgh, *Talk About Talk: Promises, Risks, and a Proposition Out of Nommo,* The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 18.4 (2004) 317-325

Notwithstanding the importance of creative speech to philosophy of language and to a community's self-formation, it remains unclear whether the collective resistance embodied in AAL meets certain interests expressed by those in whose name it is theorized. To be sure, and as Yancy argues, oppositional speech matters to the lives of the oppressed. Yet, questions remain about the terms and relations of Nommo's creativity and its significance for AAL. Conceptually, there is no account of whether Nommo is oriented toward coerced or communicatively reasoned terms of communal harmony. This absence raises a question of relation: Should AAL be understood as linguistic resistance without intent to relate to self-defined black individuals who disagree with black majoritarian terms? Put another way, do the terms of Yancy's AAL community open a space of interaction within "Black America" for the sort of opposition that Yancy's linguistic framework defends? Equally important, do these terms direct attention to speech practices that have the potential to render the dissent productive of black people's deliberation on the legitimacy of their community's self-understanding? Extending the boundaries of humane community a bit further, might [End Page 319] the power of Nommo move beyond the constitution of African American identity, experience, and community, to promote the intersubjective transformation of oppressive social norms as Fanon both worked for and hoped (Fanon 1967, 100, 222)? Asked in brief, these questions may be folded into two queries: what compass of creative power should a philosophy of language attribute to (the speech of) AAL, and how might this power be held accountable to the very members of the community in whose name(s) AAL is said to create? If there is good reason to commend the presupposition of shared nonidentity that informs these two questions, neither a sheerly instrumental Nommo nor a sheerly oppositional theory of AAL may do.[2](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_speculative_philosophy/v018/18.4clarkel.html#FOOT2) Addressing the second question first, the problem of holding power accountable to those in whose name it speaks is apparent in certain deployments of Nommo as instrumental force. The speech practice of "call and response" is a striking example. In Yancy's invocation of Nommo to account for this dynamic "co-signing and co-narrating of a shared communicative reality," a speaker makes "a verbal point" to an audience charged with responding (293). The conceived, expected response is one of "approval." If not received, the audience will likely be deemed "'dead.'" Knowles-Borishade, who comes closest to thinking the question of Nommo and dissent, offers a somewhat different account. In it, responders co-create the caller's "message—the Word" by either sanctioning or rejecting it "spontaneously during the speech," based on "the perceived morality and vision of the Caller" and "the relevance of the message" (Knowles-Borishade 1991, 497-98). According to Knowles-Borishade, call and response aims at "consensus" determined by "the people themselves" (493-94). Through the process of "checks and balances" that constitutes call and response, "levels of perfected social interaction" are promoted. Yet, in Yancy's and Knowles-Borishade's discussions of call and response, an account of disagreement and its potential to hold power accountable does not appear. At most, disagreement is figured as privatized rejection. The grounds of this response remain unknown to the speaker and audience members, among whom reasons for dissent may vary. In the face of silent rejection, the accounts of AAL's call and response are mum on what ought happen next. The dead audience plays no transparent cognitive-practice role. The caller is free to cast his word-spell. The absense of accountability in a sheerly productive word appears more readily in Asante's conception of African communication. In it, the group is thought to take precedence over the individual (Asante 1998, 74). To Asante, this "strong collective mentality" warrants a focus on the aesthetic dimension of speech in "traditional African public discourse." The focus is relatively narrow, prompting a declaration that, "The African speaker means to be a poet; not a lecturer," inducing "compulsive relationships" and invoking the audience's "inner needs" through "the inherent power" of "concrete images" (91). Though reason may matter on this account of Nommo, it is tough to see how and why. [End Page 320] Indeed, talk of reason appears relatively unimportant in Asante's "traditional" understanding of African public discourse (75, 90-91). Creativity's "highlight" shines in the absence of an explicit role for communicative reason in public speech.[3](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_speculative_philosophy/v018/18.4clarkel.html#FOOT3) Accountability appears as a non-issue, lurking uncomfortably in the shadow of creative power. Returning to the question of creative power's compass—Yancy's account of Nommo raises problems here as well. In the account, recall, the word's generative function funds "an oppositional way of speaking" (Yancy 2004, 289). Among other products, the speech acts of resistance manifest themselves in a black identity and reality based on a presumption of shared interests among African American selves.[4](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_speculative_philosophy/v018/18.4clarkel.html#FOOT4) At the same time, however, Nommo's creative force is conceptually detached from the word's power to constitute intersubjective relations between selves and others within the African American community. Thus, Yancy's concept of Nommo only admits a generative power to create identification among blacks who already agree to the presence and terms of shared interest. The power of this Nommo fails to reach those African Americans who disagree with black majoritarian terms. This relatively minimal compass of power suggests that Nommo's potential to define black community and reality may need to be reconceptualized beyond the presumptions of shared experience and common values to consider Nommo's potential to forge relations between African Americans who are divided on the terms of their present and future. The question of Nommo's compass of power is also significant for relations between African American selves and European American others. Though it may not appear to be of immediate relevance to the task of theorizing a language spoken among African Americans, the question may still be worth raising for at least two reasons: Yancy's linguistic theory of AAL is offered in the name of black Americans, and a cursory look at political discourse within the African American community reveals a centuries-old controversy over whether (or in what contexts) blacks should integrate with or separate from whites. Given the unresolved status of this controversy, African Americans may benefit from renewed discussion and debate on the terms of integration and separation and the attitude that distinguish and relate them. If so, AAL may have a role to play in the important talk ahead. Either way, the presence of these two concepts in black public discourse suggests that relations between black and white Americans is not a settled issue for the community in whose name AAL has been defined and thought. The question of Nommo's power to constitute relations between blacks and whites may therefore be relevant to thinking and defining AAL. If black and white racial division is a cause for concern in the U.S., the concept of Nommo as instrumental power butts upon a problem of relation much like the one we encountered with dissent among African Americans. Specifically, Yancy's and others' accounts of Nommo do not address the word's power to forge relations between African Americans and the white benefactors of racial [End Page 321] and racist thinking in America. Cast in relation to the production of "hidden transcripts" (Scott 1990), the power of Nommo in the aforementioned accounts is constrained to a resistance that risks foreclosing the capacity of humans to collectively define their selves and world(s). Recalling Fanon, the risk speaks to the question of whether, upon self-consciousness, an oppressed group may "choose action (or passivity) with respect to the real source of the conflict—that is, toward the social structures" (Fanon 1967, 100). The choice to act would require a concept of Nommo that works to mend division and invite intersubjective dialogue and debate about racial and racist thinking and their pernicious affects on black and white Americans, and others. Together, the question of Nommo's creative compass of power, along with the problem of holding creative power accountable to intersubjective reason, point to the risk of conceptualizing language in such a way that the word's instrumental force is disconnected from the argumentative form of communication. To leave this connection unnamed and unthought in an account of AAL is to proceed according to at least two questionable presuppositions about contemporary speech situations in which Nommo is uttered: the speaker of AAL is of good moral character; and the speaker and audience are united on their preferred form of life and the terms of their identification. While these presuppositions may have been appropriate in the past times and spaces to which African "tradition(s)" refer, today both premises are untenable in the U.S. and elsewhere in the African diaspora. Speakers regularly express a will to power and, increasingly, communities are an admixture of identities, cultural traditions, and forms of life. Present contingencies warrant an account of Nommo that invites reflection upon the products of invention attributed to AAL.[5](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_speculative_philosophy/v018/18.4clarkel.html#FOOT5)

Code- Switching furthers hegemony of whiteness – it’s a tool for domination and through white people’s ignorance

Sullivan 2004- Shannon, Penn State University, Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. 18, No. 4,. P. 301-2

While a white/Anglo person’s learning Spanish can begin to balance the relationship of power and knowledge between white/Anglo and Latino worlds, it also can have the opposite effect of increasing the hegemony of the white world. This occurs when white people learn a language other than Standard American Language—Spanish, African American Language, or otherwise—precisely to dominate the world that speaks that language. Certainly this happened during times of colonialist conquest, but it also continues today as business corporations and advertising firms in the United States learn (bits of) African American Language and Spanish to better market products that promise the “exoticism” of Blackness and the “spiciness” of Latino culture. (Standard, middleclass whiteness is so unhip nowadays, as Yancy notes [Yancy 2004, 276].) It also can happen in less insidious ways, however, such as when white people learn another language to (try to) break out of their white solipsism. Even in these well-intentioned instances, the protection provided to minority races by white people’s ignorance of their languages can be eroded once white people begin to understand and speak them.

Code-Switching opens up space for white hegemony to fill it – undermines other points of resistance

Sullivan 2004 - Shannon, Penn State University, Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. 18, No. 4,, p. 302

This point was brought home to me when a Latina friend and philosopher explained that she did not want white/Anglo people to learn Spanish because their knowledge would intrude on the Spanish/Latina world that she and other Spanish-speaking philosophers are able to create in the midst of white/Anglodominated conferences.2 Opening up her world to white/Anglo philosophers tends to result in the destruction of a valuable point of resistance to white racism. Because of the dominance of white people in philosophy in the United States, she frequently is forced to travel to white worlds and wants to preserve a small space that is relatively free of white people and the issues of race and racism that their presence inevitably (though not necessarily deliberately) produces.

Making code switching the center of the debate renders the ballot into a policing tool – makes it impossible to take it to the next level

Ladelle **McWhorter**, Professor of. Philosophy and Women's Studies, University of Richmond, Philosophy & Social Criticism, vol 31 nos 5–6, 20**05**, pp. 533–556

In the growing body of literature that makes up what has in recent years come to be called ‘Whiteness Studies’, observations like the following are commonplace: ‘Whiteness has, at least within the modern era and within Western societies, tended to be constructed as a norm, an unchanging and unproblematic location, a position from which all other identities come to be marked by their difference’ (Bonnett, 1996: 146).1 According to Whiteness Studies theorists, the white race functions not so much as a race, one among many, as, at times at least, the race – the real human race – and, at other times, no race, simply the healthy, mature norm of human existence as opposed to all those other groups of people who are somehow off-white, off-track, more or less deviant. Whiteness, the racial norm in Western industrial societies, is at one and the same time the exemplar of human being and the unmarked selfsame over against the racially marked other(s).2

 This understanding of whiteness emerged in the late 1980s and 1990s as race scholars in the USA and the UK began to treat white identity as an epistemic object, in contrast to many earlier race theorists who studied non-whites primarily.3 By taking whiteness as an object of study, these scholars problematized the status of the white race as an unmarked norm and exposed the racism implicit in its having that status. Thus, it seemed, these new race theorists had discovered a potentially very powerful tool for dismantling racism. Revealing the ways in which whiteness functions as a racial norm, they began to denaturalize it and thereby rob it of some of its power to order thought and practice. Their scholarship was and is, deliberately and unapologetically, deeply engaged political activism. Feminist sociologist Ruth Frankenberg articulates this confluence of theory and practice well when she writes: ‘Naming whiteness and white people helps dislodge the claims of both to rightful dominance’ (Frankenberg, 1993: 234).

While readers of the work of Michel Foucault may well be struck by the deep affinities between Foucaultian genealogy, counter-memory, and counter-attack on the one hand and Whiteness Studies’ denaturalization of heretofore largely unquestioned racial categories on the other, surprisingly most writers in the Whiteness Studies movement seem all but unaware of Foucault’s analytics of biopower and his descriptions of normalization.4 Their repeated observation that whiteness functions as a norm and their close analyses of its unmarked status come not out of an awareness of Foucaultian genealogy but rather out of sociological studies of institutional racism like Omi and Winant’s Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s (1994). Their work sounds like Foucault’s at times, but if they are moving toward an analysis that is like his in some ways, it is from a starting point that is radically different. In this paper I will argue that, in part because of the limitations imposed by that different starting point, Whiteness Studies theorists typically miss their mark both analytically and politically. Their major problem lies in the fact that they still work within what Foucault calls a juridical conception of power, a conception that simply does not capture the ways in which power operates in modern industrialized societies, especially in relation to the so obviously bio-political phenomenon of racial oppression.

# 2nc

## case

### 2+ off

#### Rigorously testing through multiple perspectives is critical to racial justice

Delaney 10 -- Akonadi Foundation president

(Quinn, the Akonadi Foundation is a foundation working to support and nurture a racial justice movement to put an end to the structural racism, and former ACLU chair of the board for the Northern California Affiliate for five years, served on the board at the Democracy Alliance, Pitzer College, the Family Violence Law Center, and the Tides Foundation, “Marking Progress: Movement Toward Racial Justice,” June 2010, http://racialequity.org/docs/CIF3/CIF3finalweb.pdf, accessed 7-25-12, mss)

The advocates and organizers understand this and see their work on this campaign as a piece of a bigger puzzle. When we as funders think about evaluation of this effort, we need to hold the short-term tactical progress and the long-term transformation simultaneously. Our evaluations must focus on a variety of points: the number of students, parents and teachers organized for the effort, a story of the cohesion and endurance of the organizing beyond the campaign, the quality of the campaign communications, the scope of the remaining barriers, the number of students now eligible to attend a UC campus, the importance of electing school board trustees from the community, and so on. Each approach has legitimacy to it, but determining which criteria to use as a yardstick toward progress will be important **so** that **we do not find ourselves chasing reforms that don’t add up to** substantial **transformation.** A Discourse’s Starting Point **We should consider a** wide range of perspectives **and styles** of our struggles **toward racial justice**. Some might approach evaluation through a quantitative approach with data collection, others through storytelling. We are in a **stage of experimentation** as we grapple with the best means by which to reflect on our progress, critique our missteps and gather evidence of successful practices to tell the story to each other, other funders, organizers and the media. The Philanthropic Initiative for Racial Equity has brought together the thinkers in this publication to jump-start a broader discussion of evaluation in the field of racial justice, both within philanthropy, and among those directly engaged in the work. **The** absence of a key perspective **could lead us to evaluate, and fund, an aspect of the work that** does not lead to the sought-after change. The world is simply too complex to be able to capture all of the factors and causations leading toward real and substantial change. As funders, we are limited by the system in which we operate as we seek transformational change, while funding with a short time horizon. Keeping the limitations in mind along with the urge to celebrate and strengthen what works should help bring us together to begin this conversation of how we measure and make progress toward our shared racial justice goals.

### historical injury

Founding identity around a collective historical injury is bad – it reinforces the ability of the powerful to create injury and stands in the way of true liberation or self affirmation

Brown, 1993 (Wendy, “Wounded Attachments,” Political Theory, Volume 21, Number 3, August)

Now, what I want to suggest is that in a culture already streaked with thepathos of ressentiment for these reasons, there are several characteristics oflate moder postindustrial societies that accelerate and expand the conditionsof its production. My listing is necessarily highly schematic. First, thephenomenon that William Connolly names "increased global contingency"combines with the expanding pervasiveness and complexity of dominationby capital and bureaucratic state and social networks to create an unparalleledindividual powerlessness over the fate and direction of one's own life,intensifying the experiences of impotence, dependence, and gratitude inherentin liberal capitalist orders and consitutive of ressentiment.'9 Second, thesteady desacralization of all regions of life-what Weber called disenchantment,what Nietzsche called the death of God-would appear to add yetanother reversal to Nietzsche's genealogy of ressentiment as perpetuallyavailable to "alternation of direction." In Nietzsche's account, the asceticpriest deployed notions of "guilt, sin, sinfulness, depravity and damnation"to "direct the ressentiment of the less severely afflicted sternly back uponthemselves . . . and in this way [exploited] the bad instincts of all sufferersfor the purpose of self-discipline, self-surveillance, and self-overcoming."20However, the desacralizing tendencies of late modernity undermine theefficacy of this deployment and turn suffering's need for exculpation backtoward a site of external agency. Third, the increased fragmentation, if notdisintegrationo, f all forms of associationu ntil recentlyn ot organizedb y thecommodities market-communities, churches, families-and the ubiquitousnessof the classificatory, individuating schemes of disciplinary societycombine to produce an utterly unrelieved individual, one without insulationfrom the inevitable failure entailed in liberalism's individualistic construction.In short, the characteristics of late modern secular society, in whichindividualsa reb uffeteda ndc ontrolledb y global configurationso f disciplinaryand capitalistp ower of extraordinaryp roportions,a nd are at the sametime nakedlyi ndividuated,s trippedo f reprievef rom relentlesse xposurea ndaccountability for themselves, together add up to an incitement to ressentimentthat might have stunned even the finest philosopher of its occasions andlogics. Starkly accountable, yet dramatically impotent, the late moderliberal subject quite literally seethes with ressentiment.Enter politicized identity, now conceivable in part as both product of and"reaction" to this condition, where "reaction" acquires the meaning thatNietzsche ascribed to it, namely, as an effect of domination that reiterates Impotence, a substitute for action, for power, for self-affirmation that reinscribes incapacity, powerlessness, and rejection. For Nietzsche, ressentiment itself is rooted in "reaction"-the substitution of reasons, norms, and ethics fordeeds-and not only moral systems but identities themselves take theirbearings in this reaction. As Tracy Strong reads this element of Nietzsche'sthought,Identity . . . does not consist of an active component, but is a reaction to somethingoutside; action in itself, with its inevitable self-assertive qualities, must then becomesomething evil, since it is identified with that against which one is reacting. The will topower of slave morality must constantly reassert that which gives definition to the slave:the pain he suffers by being in the world. Hence any attempt to escape that pain willmerely result in the reaffirmation of painful structures.21Ifressentiment's "cause" is suffering, its "creative deed" is the reworkingof this pain into a negative form of action, the "imaginary revenge" of whatNietzsche terms "natures denied the true reaction, that of deeds."22 Thisrevenge is achieved through the imposition of suffering "on whatever doesnot feel wratha ndd ispleasurea s he does"23(a ccomplishede specially throughthe productiono f guilt), throught he establishmento f sufferinga s the measureof social virtue, and through casting strength and good fortune ("privilege"as we say today) as self-recriminatinga, s its own indictmenti n a cultureo fsuffering: "it is disgraceful to be fortunate, there is too much misery."24But in its attempt to displace its suffering, identity structured by ressentimentat the same time becomes invested in its own subjection. This investmentlies not only in its discovery of a site of blame for its hurt will, not onlyin its acquisition of recognition through its history of subjection (a recognitionpredicated on injury, now righteously revalued), but also in the satisfactions of revenge that ceaselessly reenact even as they redistribute the injuriesof marginalization and subordination in a liberal discursive order that alternatelydenies the very possibility of these things or blames those whoexperience them for their own condition. Identity politics structured by ressentiment reverses without subverting this blaming structure: it does notsubject to critique the sovereign subject of accountability that liberal individualism presupposes nor the economy of inclusion and exclusion thatliberal universalism establishes. Thus politicized identity that presents itself as a self-affirmation now appears as the opposite, as predicated on andrequiring its sustained rejection by a "hostile external world."25Insofar as what Nietzsche calls slave morality produces identity in reactionto power, insofar as identity rooted in this reaction achieves its moral superiority by reproaching power and action themselves as evil, identity structured by this ethos becomes deeply invested in its own impotence, even while it seeks to assuage the pain of its powerlessness through its vengeful moralizing, through its wide distribution of suffering, through its reproachof power as such. Politicized identity, premised on exclusion and fueled bythe humiliation and suffering imposed by its historically structured impotencein the context of a discourse of sovereign individuals, is as likely to seek generalized political paralysis, to feast on generalized political impotence,as it is to seek its own or collective liberation. Indeed it is more likely to punish and reproach-"punishment is what revenge calls itself; with a hypocritical lie it creates a good conscience for itself'-than to find venues of self-affirming action.26

## t

### overview

#### Coal pollutions destroy African American communities and increase ozone-related diseases

BLF, SOC, GCPA, and Clear Air, 2002. Black Leadership forum- Black leaders to grapple with issues of the deepest significance to African Americans, particularly civil rights and major public policy issues, BLF sponsored two international forums in Durban, South Africa, Today focuses on environmental justice. The Southern Organizing Committee for Economic and Social Justice- SOC was in the vanguard promoting community empowerment, capacity building and grassroots organizing, particularly in the South. Under the leadership of Connie Tucker who has served as the Executive Council of the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council, its Waste and Facility Siting Sub-committee, The Georgia Coalition for The Peoples’ Agenda- an advocacy organization that includes all of the major Civil Rights/Human Rights/Peace & Justice organizations around the state of Georgia. Dr. Joseph E. Lowery is the convener of this coalition. Dr. Joseph E. Lowery is minister in the [United Methodist Church](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Methodist_Church) and leader in the [American](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States) [civil rights](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Civil_Rights_Movement_%281955-1968%29) movement and effectively became Martin Luther King’s Immediate successor , Clear the Air- A joint project of three tasks forces: Clean Air Task Force, National Environmental Trust and U.S. PIRG Education Fund. The Clean Air Task Force is a non-profit organization dedicated to restoring clean air and healthy environments through scientific research, public education and legal advocacy. The National Environmental Trust is a non-profit, non-partisan organization dedicated to applying modern communications and public education techniques to environmental education and advocacy. The U.S. PIRG Education Fund is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization that conducts independent research, and educates and organizes the public about a wide variety of environmental, consumer and government reform problems. *Air of injustice*. <http://www.catf.us/resources/publications/files/Air_of_Injustice.pdf>

This report chronicles how African Americans are affected by the air pollution emitted by our nation’s biggest polluters: coal-fired power plants. These plants release millions of pounds of a wide variety of chemicals to the air, water and landfills. This report describes the relationship between power plant pollutants like sulfur dioxide, particulate matter, mercury, nitrogen oxides and carbon dioxide and environmental health issues that have the most impact on African Americans: pediatric asthma, infant death rates, emergency room visits and hospitalizations, fish contamination and climate change. African Americans are at risk from power plant pollution. • The air in our communities violates air quality standards. In 2002, 71% of African Americans live in counties that violate federal air pollution standards, compared to 58% of the white population. (1) • Most African Americans live near a power plant. Sixty-eight percent of African Americans live within 30 miles of a coal-fired power plant — the distance within which the maximum effects of the smokestack plume are expected to occur. By comparison, about 56% of the white population live within 30 miles of a coal-fired power plant. (2) • We are likely to live near a power plant waste site. African Americans account for 17% of the people living within five miles of a power plant waste site. • Asthma attacks send African Americans to the emergency room at three times the rate (174.3 visits per 10,000 population) of whites (59.4 visits per 10,000 population). (3) • African Americans are hospitalized for asthma at more than three times the rate of whites (35.6 admissions per 10,000 population vs. 10.6 admissions per 10,000 population). (3) • The death rate from asthma for African Americans is twice that of whites (38.7 deaths per million population vs. 14.2 deaths per million population (3) . Studies in the U.S. have shown that emergency room visits increase when particulate matter and/or ozone levels are just slightly above national standards. (4,5) • In a comparison of 86 cities in the U.S., researchers found that infants who lived in a highly polluted city during their first two months of life had a higher mortality rate than infants living in the city with the cleanest air. (6) High particulate matter levels markedly increased the risk of SIDS and respiratory mortality. As African Americans live in more polluted areas, this has a significant impact. • One-third of African Americans are avid anglers, and we eat fish more often and in larger portions than whites. Consequently, we have higher exposure to mercury. In 1996, there were 1.8 million licensed African American anglers who spent over $813 million dollars on fishing trips and equipment. (7) • The potential health impacts of climate change include increased prevalence of infectious disease such as Dengue fever and West Nile virus. (8) Since many African Americans lack health insurance and regular medical access, our community is particularly at risk. (9) • A study of the 15 largest U.S. cities found that climate change would increase heat-related deaths by at least 90%. (10) Most African Americans live in inner cities, (11) which tend to be about 10 degrees warmer than their surrounding areas. Studies have shown that People of Color are twice as likely to die in a heat wave, (12) and suffer from more heat-related stress and illness.3 Global warming could enhance ozone formation, which could, in turn, exacerbate ozone-related health problems such as asthma attacks. (13) Power plants are major sources of some of the most common and harmful pollutants. (14) Power plants emit 67% of the sulfur dioxide (SO2 ) in the U.S., a noxious gas that irritates the lungs and worsens asthma, coughing, wheezing, shortness of breath and lung function in general. Power plants are also responsible for 23% of nitrogen oxides (NOx) emissions, which combine with other pollutants in the presence of sunlight to form ozone smog. Exposure to ozone can cause rapid, shallow breathing and related airway irritation, coughing, wheezing, shortness of breath and asthma attacks. Emergency room visits for asthmatic children are strongly linked to ozone levels. These pollutants also form tiny acidic particles (fine particulate matter) that are inhaled deep into the lungs, affecting both the respiratory and cardiovascular systems. Particulate matter levels in the air are strongly associated with asthma attacks. Coal-fired power plants are the largest industrial emitters of mercury, producing over one-third of all mercury pollution in the U.S. (15) The problem is not inhalation of airborne mercury, but rather eating contaminated fish. When mercury-tainted fish are consumed by an expectant mother, the mercury passes through the placenta to the developing fetus. Infants appear normal during the first few months of life, but later display subtle health effects such as poor performance on neurobehavioral tests, particularly on tests of attention, fine motor function, language, visual-spatial abilities (e.g., drawing) and memory. (16) Power plants account for 38% of the most prevalent greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide, emitted from fossil fuel use in the U.S. (17) Changes in the Earth’s temperature and precipitation patterns are occurring due to the buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Warming of the planet could induce crop failures, famines, flooding, and other environmental, economic and social problems.

## competition

### AT: We’re important

#### And, even if they win that their advocacy is good, that doesn’t mean that it’s good in the context of a debate round- the forum we choose makes all the difference

**Zompetti ’04** [Joe, April, “PERSONALIZING DEBATING: DIVERSITY AND TOLERANCE IN THE DEBATE COMMUNITY” Assistant Professor, School of Communication, Illinois State University]

**My position**, then, **is not that such arguments are untrue** (yes, marginalization exists), **but rather that such claims are not debatable. Hence, no clash can occur when such arguments are made. This destroys the nature of debate because it not only nullifies any ground the other team may have, but it also sets a very dangerous precedent where some team personally argues "x" where no alternate team may respond with "y." This is dangerous**, of course, **because debate as we know it ceases to exist – the fundamental element of clash** (i.e., the different affirmative and negative burdens) **becomes moot and irrelevant**. **Victimhood**, as is true with society as a whole, **becomes the ultimate trump card where someone's personal feelings, beliefs, or journeys supercede any attempts at verifying or locating expert testimonial evidence to the contrary. What's more, an even more dangerous impulse occurs – that people in positions of power may appropriate the arguments and rhetoric of the marginalized for their own ends**1 (Dubber, 2002).

# 1nr

### 2NC – Race Link – History

#### Racism was created to protect the labor production of chattel slavery – it was manufactured by elites as a means of protecting their interests – anti-racism strategies are co-opted and divide resistance – universal consciousness is key

**Alexander 10** (The new Jim Crow: mass incarceration in the age of colorblindness, Michelle Alexander is an associate professor of law at [Ohio State University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ohio_State_University) and a [civil rights](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_and_political_rights) advocate, who has litigated numerous [class action](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Class_action) discrimination cases and has worked on [criminal justice](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criminal_justice) reform issues. She is a recipient of a 2005 Soros Justice Fellowship of the [Open Society Institute](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_Society_Institute), has served as director of the Racial Justice Project at the [ACLU](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Civil_Liberties_Union) of Northern [California](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California), directed the Civil Rights Clinic at [Stanford](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanford_University) Law School and was a law clerk for Justice [Harry Blackmun](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harry_Blackmun) at the [U. S. Supreme Court](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supreme_Court_of_the_United_States).)

The concept of race is a relatively recent development. Only in the past few centuries, owing largely to European imperialism, have the world’s people been classified along racial lines. Here, in America, the idea of race emerged as a means of reconciling chattel slavery- as well as the extermination of American Indians – with the ideals of freedom preached by whites in the new colonies. In the early colonial period, when settlements remained relatively small, indentured servitude was the dominant means of securing cheap labor. Under this system, whites and blacks struggled to survive against a common enemy, what historian Lerone Bennett Jr. describes as “the big planter apparatus and a social system that legalized terror against black and white bondsmen.” Initially, blacks brought to this country were not all enslaved; many were treated as indentured servants. As plantation farming expanded, particularly tobacco and cotton farming, demand increased greatly for both labor and land. The demand for land was met by invading and conquering larger and large swaths of territory. American Indians became a growing impediment to white European “progress,” and during this period, the images of American Indians promoted in books, newspapers, and magazines became increasingly negative. As sociologists Keith Kilty and Eric Swank have observed, eliminating “savages” is less of a moral problem than eliminating human beings, and therefore American Indians came to be understood as a lesser race- uncivilized savages- thus providing a justification for the extermination of the native peoples. The growing demand for labor on plantations was met through slavery. American Indians were considered unsuitable as slaves, largely because native tribes were clearly in a position to fight back. The fear of raids by Indian tribes left plantation owners to grasp for an alternative source of free labor. European immigrants were also deemed poor candidates for slavery, not because of their race, but rather because they were in short supply and enslavement would, quite naturally, interfere with voluntary immigration to the new colonies. Plantation owners thus view Africans, who were relatively powerless, as the ideal slaves. The systemic enslavement of Africans, and the rearing of their children under bondage, emerged with all deliberate speed- quickened by events such as Bacon’s Rebellion. Nathaniel Bacon was a white property owner in Jamestown, Virginia, who managed to united slaves, indentured servants, and poor whites in a revolutionary effort to overthrow the planter elite. Although slaves clearly occupied the lowest position in the social hierarchy and suffered the most under the plantation, the condition of indentured whites was barely better, and the majority of free whites lived in extreme poverty. As explained by historian Edmund Morgan, in colonies like Virginia, the planter elite, with huge land grants, occupied a vastly superior position to workers of all colors. Southern colonies did not hesitate to invent ways to extend the terms of servitude, and the planter class accumulated uncultivated lands to restrict the options of free workers. The simmering resentment against the planter class created conditions that were ripe for revolt. Varying accounts of Bacon’s rebellion abound, but the basic facts are these: Bacon developed plans in 1675 to seize Native American lands in order to acquire more property for himself and others and nullify the threat of Indian raids. When the planter elite in Virginia refused to provide militia support for his scheme, Bacon retaliated, leading to an attack on the elite, their homes, and their property. He openly condemned the rich for their oppression of the poor and inspired an alliance of white and black bond laborers, as well as slaves, who demanded an end to their servitude. The attempted revolution was ended by force and false promises of amnesty. A number of the people who participated in the revolt were hanged. The events in Jamestown were alarming to the planter elite, who were deeply fearful of the multiracial alliance of bond workers and slave. Word of Bacon’s rebellion spread far and wide, and several more uprisings of a similar type followed. In an effort to protect their superior status and economic position, the planters shifted their strategy for maintaining dominance. They abandoned their heavy reliance on indentured servants in favor of the importation of more black slaves. Instead of importing English-speaking slaves from the West Indies, who were more likely to be familiar with European language and culture, many more slaves were shipped directly from Africa. These slaves would be far easier to control and far less likely to form alliances with poor whites. Fearful that such measures might not be sufficient to protect their interests, the planter class took an additional precautionary step, a step that would later come to be known as a “racial bribe.” Deliberately and strategically, the planter class extended special privileges to poor whites in an effort to drive a wedge between them and black slaves. White settlers were allowed greater access to Native American lands, white servants were allowed to police slaves through slave patrols and militias, and barriers were created so that free labor would not be placed in competition with slave labor. These measures effectively eliminated the risk of future alliances between black slaves and poor whites. Poor whites suddenly had a direct, personal stake in the existence of a race-based system of slavery. Their own plight had not improved by much, but at least they were not slaves. Once the planter elite split the labor force, poor whites responded to the logic of their situation and sought ways to expand their racially privileged position. By the mid-1770s, the system of bond labor had been thoroughly transformed into a racial caste system predicated on slavery. The degraded status of Africans was justified on the ground that Negros, like the Indians, were an uncivilized lesser race, perhaps even more lacking in intelligence and laudable human qualities than the red-skinned natives. The notion of white supremacy rationalized the enslavement of Africans, even as whites endeavored to form a new nation based on the ideals of equality, liberty, and justice for all. Before democracy, chattel slavery was born.

### 2NC – Race Link: Code Switch

#### Codeswitching represents a cultural response to sociological conditions determined by objective economic and historical realities

#### **Heller ‘88** (Monica, Professor in the Department of Sociology and Equity Studies in Education and the Centre de Recherches en éducation franco-ontarienne at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education of the University of Toronto, *Codeswitching: Anthropological and Sociolinguistic Perspectives*, P. 248)

To reach an understanding of these differences, we need a comparative analysis that interprets codeswitching practices not only as conversational tools that maintain or change ethnic group boundaries and personal relationships but also as symbolic creations concerned with the construction of ‘self’ and ‘other’ within a broader political economic and historical context.  This suggests that the study of how codes are deployed in conversation is not only a sociolinguistic problem.  Because codeswitching usually involves the use of a state-supported and powerfully legitimated language in opposition to a stigmatized minority language that has considerably less institutional support, it can also provide fresh evidence of what neo-Marxist culture theory (e.g. Williams 1973) identifies as “consciousness”: how speakers respond symbolically to relations of domination between groups within the state, and how they understand their historic position and identity within a world capitalist system structured around dependency and unequal development.  To explain variation in codeswitching, an integration of conversational, ethnographic and social historical evidence is required.  It is true that, as the papers in this volume amply demonstrate, codeswitching is a conversational strategy used to establish, cross or destroy group boundaries; to create, evoke or change interpersonal relations with their accompanying rights and obligations.  But the conversations themselves take place within and between groups whose interactions are shaped not only by Barthian (1969) considerations of ethnic boundaries and competition over resources.  As student of ethnicity have argued in response to Barth, ethnic groups have specifiable structural positions of power or subordination in their regional economy and, even groups within socialist states or in apperntly peripheral geographic areas are importantly affected by their relation to world capitalist forces.  This larger context is crucial in shaping the nature of interactions between and within ethnic groups, the permeability of boundaries, the definitions and evaluations of actions and resources, and the nature of competition across boundaries

### 2NC – AT: Perm

#### The perm wrecks the alternative – race as a starting point for politics conceals the classed dimension of oppression – the alternative makes visible race as an effect of class and universalizes resistance against capital

Young 1 (Robert, Prof of American American literary and cultural theory, " The Linguistic Turn, Materialism and Race Toward an Aesthetics of Crisis," Callaloo 24.1 (2001) 334-345, Muse)

Not only do such postmodern discourses reify culture, in what Kenan Malik calls "cultural formalism," but in their anti-totality move and privileging of the logic of indeterminacy postmodernists suppress notions of causality. Postmodern discourses of race merely assert the constructedness of the (race) sign and **bracket** the political economy of race, and consequently the text is set as the limit of intelligibility. In arguing for the "constructed-ness" of race but locating it textually there is a theoretical problem in accounting for the textual inscription of race or its extra-textual effects in daily life under capitalism (and we must account for extra-textual effects because for people of color it is a matter of life and death). Postmodernists are unable **to explain** why race has acquired its oppressive social meaning in the first place and across various localities--that is race is a translocal articulation. Reading race as essentially constructed but not accounting for its production, race is mystified and metaphysics is reintroduced; in fact, in a recent symposium on race and racism Howard Winant asserts that "Race remains a mysterious phenomenon"(7). Race is not a mystery as it operates today as a material practice in marking racially coded subjects for differential levels of surplus extraction and violence and it has an historical emergence. As Alex Callinicos indicates, "Racism as we know it today **developed during a key phase** in the **development of capitalism** as the dominant mode of production on a global scale--the establishment during the 17th and 18th centuries of colonial plantations in the New World using slave labour imported from Africa to produce consumer goods such as tobacco and sugar and industrial outputs such as cotton for the world market" (11). As Eric Williams succinctly put it, "**Slavery was not born of racism: rather, racism was the consequence of slavery**" (7). While most postmodern discourses have moved away from ontologically based inquiries, a recent essay by Linda Alcoff attempts to (re)configure race as an "ontological" category. Her intervention opens the possibility for foregrounding the nexus between race and materialism. This possibility is quickly closed down as her discourse moves away from materialism and thus for Alcoff "Race is a particular, historically and culturally located form of human categorization . . ." (7). The question again is why? Why is race a form of human categorization? And is race identity really a matter of language games? And are these games essentially self-originating and autonomous? Of course not. These "games" are always **already situated within and the effect of the prevailing economic** **/ political /cultural /ideological conditions**. As Malik points out "Racial differentiation emerges out of real social and economic mechanisms" (10), and they are not ontologically pre-given. In other words, this human categorization is an historical articulation of racialized division of labor structuring asymmetrical access to surplus. Alcoff reduces thought about the real to the real itself and this articulates an empiricist idealism. Therefore what is really at stake here is not so much the question of ontology and the related question of objectivity--which puts one on [End Page 336] the road to materialism--as much as it is the articulation of what Roy Bhaskar has called the "epistemic fallacy" and consequently the recuperation of experience. One must remember Alcoff's original concern was not only to "validate hybrid identity or hybrid positionality against purist, essentialist accounts" but also to "take into account the full force of race as a lived experience" (9). Of course, as I also pointed out earlier, it is **politically urgent** to **mark** such experiences but an ontological reinscription of race reifies race and as such disables a transformative project--a project aimed at **negating the deployment of race as a structure for exploitation**.